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11.1 Introduction
Like many other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries, the United Kingdom has been experiencing a
trend towards earlier labor market exits among older, particularly male,
workers. The proportion of men aged sixty to sixty-four in employment
halved from 1968, when 80 percent were employed, to only a little over 40
percent in 1996. The fall in the proportion of older men who were in full-time
employment was even greater than the fall in the proportion in any form of
employment, with a relative shift within the employed to self-employment
and part-time employment (see ﬁgure 11.1). Female employment has not
experienced the same downward trend—but this contrasts with rising par-
ticipation among most other age groups across the same period.
This paper looks at the extent to which these trends might be explained
by the ﬁnancial incentives in the pension system that people faced when
making their retirement decisions. In doing so, we focus not only on the
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.pensions provided by the state, but also on employer-provided pensions
and on other state beneﬁts, such as invalidity beneﬁt, all of which have
played a crucial role in the United Kingdom. Compared to many other Eu-
ropean countries, the United Kingdom stands out as having a high level of
coverage by private pensions and, at least in recent years, a trend towards
less generous state pension provision.
This has not always been the case. In the 1970s, the trend was going the
other way toward more generous state provision. The main element of the
state pension system, the basic state pension, was increased each year in
line with earnings or prices, whichever was the greatest. In 1978, a new
second-tier earnings-related pension—the State Earnings Related Pension
Scheme (SERPS)—was introduced that was originally intended to pay a
pension worth 25 percent of an individual’s best twenty years of earnings.
However, SERPS was never a universal scheme for all employees. When
it was introduced, workers who already belonged to a (deﬁned-beneﬁt)
occupational pension could opt out of the state scheme, as well as pay re-
duced National Insurance contributions, so long as their occupational
scheme guaranteed at least the same pension as SERPS. This applied to
more than half of all employees and to more than two-thirds of male em-
ployees.
Since the early 1980s, successive reforms have cut back the generosity of
state pension provision. The indexation of the basic state pension to earn-
ings lasted only until 1982, since when it has been formally indexed to
prices and has fallen relative to average earnings. Reforms to SERPS in
1986 and 1995 have reduced its generosity for anyone retiring after 2000.
Also, the state pension age for women, currently sixty, is set to increase to
sixty-ﬁve by 2020. These reforms were coupled with further encourage-
ment for individuals to make a private pension provision. In 1988, the right
to opt out of SERPS was extended to those with a deﬁned-contribution
scheme. In practice, this meant a growth in individual retirement accounts
(personal pensions) and the development of deﬁned-contribution occupa-
tional pensions, although these are still a minority of all employer schemes.
The growth in personal pensions was rapid. By the early 1990s, they cov-
ered nearly one-quarter of employees and an even higher proportion of
younger workers.
The trend towards less generous state pension provision means that, in
spite of an aging population, the future cost of the state pensions is set to
fall as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2050 (see table
11.1), making the situation in the United Kingdom diﬀerent to most other
OECD countries.1
However, it is worth bearing in mind that spending on pensions rep-
resents only part of total government spending on beneﬁts for older
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1. See Johnson (1999) for a discussion.nonworkers. In the 1980s, there was a very large increase in the number of
older nonworkers on disability beneﬁts2 (see ﬁgure 11.2) and spending on
these beneﬁts has more than doubled in real terms since 1990. Also, as
the level of the basic state pension has now fallen below the level of means-
tested beneﬁts for pensioners, many pensioners are eligible for means-tested
beneﬁts on top of their state pension. By 2000–2001 more than one-third of
pensioners were receiving means-tested beneﬁts. Means testing is becom-
ing an increasingly important element in state provision for pensioners
with the introduction of an earnings-indexed means-tested Minimum In-
come Guarantee for pensioners from April 1999.
In this paper, we consider a cohort of workers retiring at the beginning
of the 1990s and study the impact of the incentives in public and private
pension schemes on their retirement. This cohort was in employment when
coverage of deﬁned-beneﬁt occupational pensions was at its peak. Most
men in the cohort belonged to an occupational pension scheme, and this is
likely to be the key ﬁnancial determinant of when they retire. Previous anal-
ysis has shown clear diﬀerences in the retirement behavior of people with
and without occupational pensions—see Disney, Meghir, and Whitehouse
(1994) and Blundell and Johnson (1998, 1999). Those with occupational
pensions are more likely to remain in employment up to age sixty than
those without, but are more likely to leave after this age (see ﬁgure 11.3).
This diﬀerence in behavior has been attributed to the incentive structure of
occupational pensions, but this has never been modeled explicitly. This pa-
per therefore represents an important contribution to increasing under-
standing of the incentive eﬀects of occupational pensions on retirement.
The state pension scheme is likely to have a smaller incentive eﬀect on re-
tirement behavior in the United Kingdom than that in other countries. The
earnings-related element (SERPS) was adopted only in 1978 and is of rel-
atively smaller magnitude than in other European countries. It will also be
irrelevant to those people who opted out into occupational pension or per-
sonal pension schemes (and to many married women who opted out of the
state pension system altogether). Only a minority of people in our sample
of retirees remained in SERPS, although they form an interesting group to
look at since SERPS was nearing its peak in terms of generosity at the time
they were retiring.
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Table 11.1 Projected State Spending on Pensions in the United Kingdom
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
% of GDP 4.5 5.2 5.1 5.5 4.0 4.1
Source: Banks and Emmerson (2000).
























































































sThis paper models retirement incentives for the cohort of individuals in
the U.K. Retirement Survey (Department of Social Security and Oﬃce for
Population and Census Surveys, various years). This is a two-wave panel
survey of a sample of individuals born between 1919 and 1933. The ﬁrst
wave, conducted between November 1988 and January 1989, collected in-
formation on 3,543 key respondents then aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-nine.
About two-thirds of the original sample were reinterviewed in 1994. The
Retirement Survey has a larger sample of individuals in the relevant age
range than any general household or individual surveys in the United
Kingdom and is therefore the best currently available data for analyzing re-
tirement behavior. However, it is considerably smaller than the adminis-
trative data sets used in other countries’ studies. It also lacks complete
earnings histories and full information on the rules of individuals’ occupa-
tional pension schemes. Instead, we match earnings proﬁles from cross-
sectional surveys on the basis of cohort, education, and industry. We also
model the individual’s occupational pension entitlement according to
the rules of the most common scheme in the sector that the individual
works in.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the U.K.
pension system and the key elements that are likely to aﬀect retirement be-
havior. Section 11.3 provides further information on the Retirement Survey
and the selection criteria that we use for choosing a sample of individuals
for analyzing retirement behavior. Section 11.4 describes the construction
of earnings- and pension-incentive measures. Section 11.5 contains the re-
sults from estimating probit models of retirement that include these incen-
tive measures and discusses their implications for retirement behavior by
means of alternative scenarios for reforms to the pension system. In sec-
tion 11.6, we present simulation results from two policy reforms designed
to reduce the incentives for early retirement in the current pension system.
Section 11.7 concludes.
11.2 Policy Environment
The U.K. pension system is two-tiered. The ﬁrst tier, provided by the
state, consists of the basic state pension and a signiﬁcant level of means-
tested beneﬁts (made more signiﬁcant by the introduction of the Minimum
Income Guarantee for pensioners in April 1999). The second tier, compul-
sory for all employees with earnings above a certain ﬂoor, is made up of the
SERPS3and a large and growing level of private provision (see ﬁgure 11.4).
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3. The SERPS will be replaced by the state second pension from 2002. This will eﬀectively
be a ﬂat-rate top-up to the basic state pension and more generous than SERPS to low earn-
ers. Most workers will be encouraged to opt out into private provision.11.2.1 The Basic State Pension
The basic state pension is a ﬂat-rate contributory beneﬁt payable to
people aged over the state pension age (sixty-ﬁve for men and sixty for
women4) who have made suﬃcient contributions throughout their work-
ing lives.5 From April 2000, the basic state pension is worth £72.50 a week
for a single pensioner. Prior to 1978, married women could opt to pay a re-
duced rate of National Insurance, which meant they did not qualify for a
basic state pension in their own right. Couples in which one partner does
not qualify for the basic state pension receive a dependent addition, irre-
spective of whether they have ever worked or not. Since 1989, there has
been no earnings test for receipt of the basic state pension,6 although indi-
viduals who choose to defer will increase the value of their pension by 10
percent for each year of deferral.7
11.2.2 The State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS)
The ﬁrst part of the second tier of pension provision is the SERPS. In-
troduced in 1978, this pays a pension equal to a fraction of an individual’s
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Fig. 11.4 U.K. pension system, 1990
4. The retirement age for women will be raised by six months each year from 2010 to 2020
so that equalization is achieved in 2020.
5. To qualify for the basic state pension, individuals need to have made or be credited with
National Insurance contributions for 90 percent of their working lives. Credits are available
for periods of illness, disability, or unemployment.
6. See Disney and Smith (2002) for a discussion of the eﬀects of the abolition of the earn-
ings test on labor supply.
7. Increased from 7.5 percent in 1995.qualifying annual earnings (above a speciﬁed lower-earnings limit) each
year since 1978. When it was introduced, SERPS was intended to pay a
pension worth one-quarter of an individual’s best twenty years’ earnings
(up to a speciﬁed upper-earnings limit). Subsequent reductions in the gen-
erosity of SERPS mean that it is worth only 20 percent of average lifetime
earnings to anyone retiring after 2000. Married women who opted to pay
reduced-rate National Insurance contributions do not qualify for SERPS.
Currently widows can claim their husbands’ SERPS pensions in full if they
receive no additional pension in their own right.8 After retirement the
SERPS pension is uprated each year in line with prices.
11.2.3 Income Support and Invalidity Beneﬁt
In addition to the basic state pension and SERPS, there are two other
state beneﬁts that are taken up widely by older nonworkers—income sup-
port and incapacity beneﬁt (formerly invalidity beneﬁt). Income support is
a ﬂat-rate, noncontributory, means-tested beneﬁt. It is paid automatically
to people aged sixty or more who do not work. Unlike people in younger
age groups, the over-sixties do not have to show that they are actively seek-
ing work in order to qualify. From April 1999, income support for pen-
sioners was renamed the Minimum Income Guarantee and made more
generous with an increase in the level and a commitment to uprate in line
with earnings, at least for the short to medium term.
Incapacity beneﬁt (formerly invalidity beneﬁt) is a contributory beneﬁt
paid to the long-term sick and disabled. In the case of invalidity beneﬁt, an
individual qualiﬁed on the basis of medical certiﬁcates from their general
practitioner (GP) showing them to be incapable of the work that was “rea-
sonable” to expect them to do (given their age, qualiﬁcations, and so forth).
With the introduction of incapacity beneﬁt in 1995, this was changed to
a stricter “all work test” carried out by a doctor employed by the Beneﬁts
Agency Medical Service. The change from invalidity beneﬁt to incapacity
beneﬁt was a response to very rapid growth in receipt during the 1980s. A
key feature of incapacity beneﬁt (and invalidity beneﬁt) is that, before
April 2001, it was not means tested and could be received in conjunction
with private pension income (unlike income support). From April 2001, it
will be means tested against occupational pension income.
11.2.4 Occupational and Personal Pensions
Compared to most other European countries, the United Kingdom has
a high level of coverage of private pensions, including both occupational
pensions and individual retirement accounts, known in the United King-
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8. This was due to be reduced to half from April 2000. However the failure of the govern-
ment to properly inform individuals of the change in entitlement led to the reform being de-
layed.dom as personal pensions. Any individual can choose to contract out of
SERPS, into one of these two types of secondary private pensions (and
from April 2001, people are also able to choose to opt out into a stake-
holder pension, which is eﬀectively a benchmarked individual retirement
account). Members of deﬁned-beneﬁt occupational schemes pay a reduced
rate of National Insurance, while those with deﬁned-contribution occupa-
tional pensions or personal pensions receive a National Insurance rebate
paid directly into their fund.
Occupational pensions currently cover around 45 percent of employees,
down from a peak of over 50 percent in the early 1980s. They are typically
deﬁned-beneﬁt schemes (DB; see table 11.2), although since 1988, em-
ployees have also been allowed to opt out into deﬁned contribution (DC)
occupational schemes, and there has been a gradual shift from DB to DC
schemes since then (see Disney and Stears 1996). The decline in coverage
of occupational pension schemes is due to a number of factors. It reﬂects
changing employment patterns and a shift to smaller employers. Also, it
reﬂects increasing pension choice among individuals working for employ-
ers oﬀering occupational pensions who, since 1988, can no longer be com-
pelled to join the scheme.
Since 1988, individuals have been able to contract out of SERPS (and
leave their occupational scheme) and take out a personal pension. To kick
start these schemes when they were introduced, a bonus National Insur-
ance contribution of 2 percent was paid by the government, in addition to
the contracted-out rebate. By the mid-1990s, around 6 million people (more
than one-quarter of all employees) had taken out a personal pension. Take-
up was higher among younger workers, as would be expected. However,
there is a serious issue over the number of older workers who were “mis-
sold” personal pensions by ﬁnancial advisers who wrongly advised them
that they would be better oﬀ leaving their occupational pension scheme.
Table 11.3summarizes labor market participation and income receipt by
age using data from the Family Expenditure Survey 1994–1995 (correspon-
ding to the second wave of the Retirement Survey). It shows relatively high
rates of labor market withdrawal among men before the state pension age.
The two most important sources of income before state pension age are in-
come from private (predominantly occupational) pensions and disability
beneﬁt. It is important to stress that these two sources of income are not al-
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Table 11.2 Occupational Schemes: Deﬁned Beneﬁt (DB) versus Deﬁned
Contribution (DC)
% Private-Sector Schemes % Public-Sector Schemes % All Schemes
DB plans 78 98 80
DC plans 16 2 14
Hybrid 6 0 6
Source: National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) 1998.ways alternative preretirement income sources, but are typically received
together by the same people. The fact that disability beneﬁt was not means
tested meant that it could be received in conjunction with other forms of
income. Three-quarters of people in receipt of disability beneﬁt income
also received some money from a private pension.
11.3 Data Overview
11.3.1 The Retirement Survey
The main data used for analyzing retirement behavior are drawn from
the U.K. Retirement Survey (RS), a household panel survey collected by
the Oﬃce for Population and Census Surveys on behalf of the Department
for Social Security. This is the ﬁrst large-scale panel data set in the United
Kingdom to focus on individuals around the time of retirement (see Bone
et al. 1992). Two waves of data were collected on a national random sample
of individuals born between 1919 and 1933. The ﬁrst wave of the survey
was conducted between November 1988 and January 1989 and collected
information on 3,543 key respondents (who were aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-
nine). The key respondents include spouses if they were in the relevant age
range. In addition, information was also collected on 609 spouses outside
this age range. About two-thirds of the original sample were reinterviewed
in 1994, and 11 percent of respondents disappeared in this interval due to
mortality; the residual attrition is a combination of nonresponse and (per-
haps) unreported mortality.9
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Table 11.3 Labor Market Participation and Beneﬁt Receipt
Disability
Gender Full-Time Part-Time Not Public Private Disability Beneﬁts  Other
and Age Work Work Working Pension Pension Beneﬁts + Private Beneﬁts
Men
50–54 0.6447 0.2053 0.1500 0.0000 0.0947 0.0737 0.0237 0.0658
55–59 0.4620 0.1881 0.3598 0.0000 0.3432 0.1386 0.0825 0.0728
60-64 0.2680 0.1787 0.5533 0.0000 0.5395 0.2096 0.1478 0.1237
65–69 0.0213 0.0816 0.8972 0.8121 0.7411 0.1667 0.1312 0.0532
Women
50–54 0.4667 0.2427 0.2907 0.0507 0.1040 0.0400 0.0133 0.0480
55–59 0.2936 0.2385 0.4679 0.0975 0.1988 0.0398 0.0061 0.0520
60–64 0.0909 0.1394 0.7697 0.7970 0.3606 0.0242 0.0152 0.0485
65–69 0.0156 0.0688 0.9156 0.9594 0.4125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0469
Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1994–1995 (U.K. Data Archives, 1996).
9. The high attrition rate is largely due to the fact that the survey was not originally intended
to be a panel survey. Hence, little attempt was made to keep in touch with respondents after
the ﬁrst wave.The RS oﬀers a relatively large sample of people in the relevant age
range, compared to more general panel surveys, such as the British House-
hold Panel Survey. It also oﬀers very rich demographic, economic, and
health information on individuals—and their spouses—in both waves.
And it has employment history information and private pension history
information dating all the way back to individuals’ ﬁrst jobs.10 However,
compared to the administrative datasets available in other countries, the
sample in the RS is relatively small (and is reduced by the high attrition rate
between the two waves). Also, the survey does not collect earnings-history
information, which is needed to calculate exact pension entitlements for
each individual. Instead, as we describe in the next section, we have to im-
pute earnings histories on the basis of employment-history information.
The analysis of retirement behavior in this paper is based on a subsam-
ple of people in the RS. The group we look at comprises those who were
• below the state pension age in wave 1, that is, men aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to
sixty-four or women aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine in 1988–1989;
• working in wave 1 with nonmissing earnings information and no in-
come from occupational pension schemes, unemployment beneﬁt, or
income support;
• and interviewed in both waves.
Excluding people who fail to meet any one of these criteria leaves 456 in-
dividuals—283 men and 173 women. Each of these individuals remains in
the sample from 1989 until they leave employment, leaving a total sample
of 1,998 person observations. Summary sample characteristics based on all
person observations are given in table 11.4.
11.3.2 Earnings Histories and Projections
To calculate state pension entitlements, we need individual earnings pro-
ﬁles going back to 1978, when SERPS was introduced. These are absent in
the RS, but the survey does provide detailed work histories documenting
spells in employment, whether the employment was part time or full time,
and in which industry the individual worked, which, together with infor-
mation on age and education, allow us to match earnings proﬁles from
cross-sectional data. There is no single dataset with consistent information
on these variables going back to 1978. Instead, we combine information
from two datasets to get consecutive cross-sectional waves of data from
1978 to 1989—the Family Expenditure Survey(1978–1986) and the General
Household Survey (1987–1989). Projecting forward from 1989, we assume
constant real wages.
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10. For a good overview of information in the RS (Department of Social Security and
Oﬃce for Population and Census Surveys, various years), see Disney, Grundy, and Johnson
(1998).Table 11.4 Sample Characteristics
Men Women
No. of observations 1,276 722
Mean age 61.50 59.87
Proportion currently married 0.8659 0.7659
Age diﬀerence between individual and spouse 
(years) 2.80 –1.17
Net earnings ($) 18,157 9,064
Proportion with an occupational pension 0.6857 0.3850
Proportion of women paying reduced-rate NI 0.0000 0.7410
Length of time in current job (years) 12.16 9.85
Proportion of time since leaving education in 
full-time employment 0.6143 0.2341
Industry, energy 0.0940 0.0000
Industry, engineering 0.0030 0.0457
Industry, manufacturing 0.2014 0.1191
Industry, distribution 0.1951 0.1551
Industry, services 0.2429 0.6053
Industry, government 0.0635 0.0748
Zero ﬁnancial wealth 0.1897 0.1856
£1–£3,000 ﬁnancial wealth 0.4036 0.4460
£3,000–£10,000 ﬁnancial wealth 0.2045 0.1717
 £10,000 ﬁnancial wealth 0.1575 0.1399
Missing ﬁnancial wealth 0.0447 0.0568
School dropout 0.4397 0.6108
High school education  0.4287 0.3047
College 0.1317 0.0545
Health in 1988 (severity score) 0.3017 0.3670
Variable Deﬁnition
High school dropout No qualiﬁcation
High school graduate O levels; A levels; school certiﬁcate; certiﬁcate of sixth-form 
studies; clerical and commercial qualiﬁcations (e.g., typing, 
shorthand, bookkeeping, and commerce); city and guilds; 
nursing qualiﬁcations; other qualiﬁcation; recognized trade 
apprenticeship
College University degree or diploma; teaching qualiﬁcation; membership 
of professional institution
Severity score Measure of self-assessed health status based on the international 
classiﬁcation of impairments, disabilities, and handicaps 
(ICDIH). 
Separate scales are constructed for areas of locomotion, 
reaching and stretching, dexterity, seeing, hearing, continence, 
communication, personal care, behavior, intellectual functioning, 
consciousness, digestion, and disﬁgurement. The severity score 
is constructed as a weighted average of the three highest-severity 
scores from the 13 areas: Highest + 0.4 (second highest) + 0.3 
(third highest).
Note: NI = National Insurance; FT = Full-timeWe also exploit the earnings information that is available in the ﬁrst
wave of the RS to construct an individual ﬁxed eﬀect, which we use to ad-
just the individual’s entire earnings proﬁle. We assume that the wage of in-
dividual iin cohort, education, and industry subgroup gin periodtcan be
expressed as
W igt    iW gt
where  i is a constant individual ﬁxed eﬀect, W ig88/W g88, where W ig88 is taken
from the RS and W g88 is calculated from the cross-sectional data. Our
underlying assumption is that macro-shocks aﬀect everyone in the cohort,
education, and industry subgroup in the same way.
11.4 Construction of Incentive Measures
Each individual’s total pension wealth and pension accrual measures
are built up from combining four separate elements of the pension sys-
tem—the basic state pension, the state earnings-related scheme (SERPS),
occupational pensions, and invalidity beneﬁt.11 In this section, we discuss
how each of these individual elements is constructed. We also discuss po-
tential sources of variation in total pension wealth and accrual rates by
which we might identify the impact of pension incentives on retirement be-
havior.
11.4.1 The Basic State Pension
Calculation of basic state pension entitlement is straightforward. It de-
pends on the total number of years of contribution and, for a married
woman, on whether or not she opted to pay reduced-rate National Insur-
ance contributions. This latter piece of information is known directly from
the RS.
Although the basic state pension is ﬂat rate, total wealth will vary across
individuals because of the dependent’s allowance and because of the fact
that widows not entitled to a pension in their own right can claim their for-
mer spouse’s pension in full when their spouse dies. In these cases, we need
to compute husbands’ total pension wealth over the life of the couple,
based on the age diﬀerence between the spouses. Obviously, the larger the
age diﬀerence between husband and wife, the greater the husband’s total
pension wealth.
11.4.2 State Earnings Related Pension Scheme
The precise formula for calculating an individual’s SERPS pension is
given by
SERPS   ∑
R






    LELR 1  Rt,w here W ˜
t   min(W t, UEL).
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11. We ignore income support since it is a universal beneﬁt.Earnings up to the annual upper-earnings limit (UEL) are revalued to the
year of reaching state pension age (R) using an index of economy-wide av-
erage earnings (Y R/Y t ). The lower-earnings limit (LEL) in the year prior to
the individual reaching state pension age is deducted from each year’s
revalued earnings ﬁgure and the net of LEL earnings are multiplied by an
accrual factor ( Rt).12 For people retiring before 2000, the accrual rate was
1.25 percent a year. Details of earnings factors, upper- and lower-earnings
limits, and accrual rates are given by table 11A.1 in the appendix. Having
calculated earnings proﬁles for each individual in the RS, their SERPS en-
titlements are fairly straightforward to calculate. We assume zero SERPS
pension for people who are in occupational pension schemes and for mar-
ried women who have opted to pay reduced-rate National Insurance con-
tributions.
There are several potential sources of variation in SERPS pension
wealth across individuals. Total wealth, but not accrual, will be aﬀected by
an individual’s employment history since 1978—both the number of years
they have been in employment and their earnings—while projected earn-
ings in the future will have an impact on expected total wealth and accrual.
Another important factor for determining total wealth (but not accrual)
will be the individual’s age in 1978. This was when SERPS was introduced
and an individual’s age in that year will determine the period over which
they are able to accrue rights to a SERPS pension before reaching state
pension age. The maximum SERPS pension to which an individual could
be entitled, for each year of retirement since 1978 is shown in ﬁgure 11.5
(and also the SERPS entitlement based on average earnings). For example,
someone reaching state pension age in 1979 would receive practically no
SERPS pension since they would only have been building up entitlement
for one year.13 Someone retiring in 1998 could have accrued rights to a
SERPS pension of up to £5,000 a year by earning the upper-earnings limit
for twenty years.
As shown in table 11A.1, accrual rates will change after 2000, but this re-
form will not aﬀect the cohort of individuals in the RS, all of whom will
have reached the state pension age before then. Finally, the fact that wid-
ows can claim their former husbands’ SERPS pensions if they receive no
pension in their own right means that, as with the basic state pension, a
man’s marital status, and the age diﬀerence between them and their spouse
also aﬀects their total pension wealth and accrual.
Table 11.5 compares our estimates of individuals’ SERPS pension with
the actual SERPS pension they received where this information is available
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12. Starting April 2000 this formula changes. Instead of uprating annual earnings and then
subtracting the LEL from the year prior to retirement, the LEL from the year worked is sub-
tracted from earnings ﬁrst, and then the diﬀerence is uprated in line with earnings growth.
Since the LEL is annually uprated in line with the basic state pension (i.e., with prices), this
has the eﬀect of reducing the generosity of SERPS.
13. Individuals cease to build up entitlements once they pass the state pension age.(i.e., for individuals who had retired by the second wave of the RS and re-
ported pension receipt). On average, we underpredict individuals’ SERPS
pensions, and while the correlation coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, it
is fairly low, compared to that for occupational pensions (see following dis-
cussion). One possible explanation is that individuals who are in SERPS—
and therefore not in occupational pension schemes—are likely to have had
more variable employment histories than those who are in occupational
schemes. Our method for estimating earnings proﬁles may be missing a lot
of variation in their previous earnings, which would also matter more for
SERPS than for occupational pensions that are typically determined only
according to recent years’ earnings.
11.4.3 Invalidity Beneﬁt
One possible way to treat entitlement to invalidity beneﬁt would be to as-
sume that only individuals who received the beneﬁt were eligible and that
all those who satisﬁed the eligibility conditions received the beneﬁt. How-
ever, given the potential for subjective evaluations of “incapacity for work”
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Fig. 11.5 SERPS entitlement
Table 11.5 Predicted and Actual SERPS Pensions
Actual SERPS pension received in 1994 ($) 4,315
Imputed SERPS pension in retirement year ($) 3,849
Correlation coeﬃcient 0.3334
No. of observations 102and “reasonable work” and in the light of signiﬁcant variation in the num-
ber of people receiving the beneﬁt over time (as well as anecdotal evidence
of diﬀerences between doctors in their willingness to certify individuals as
being incapable of work), this assumption is inappropriate. Instead, we cal-
culate an individual’s invalidity-beneﬁt wealth on the basis of an assigned
probability that they will receive the beneﬁt. These probabilities are de-
rived from a probit model for receipt of invalidity beneﬁt as a function of
characteristics such as age, education, region, tenure, marital status, and
spouse’s employment status, which we estimate using data drawn from the
Family Expenditure Survey from April 1988 to March 1994. We impute
probabilities for individuals in the RS on the basis of matched characteris-
tics. The probit results are reported in appendix table 11A.2.
11.4.4 Occupational Pensions
The pension received in a DB occupational pension scheme is typically
determined by a formula of the type:
P   (PER    LELR 1)N,
where P is the annual occupational pension,   is the scheme-speciﬁc ac-
crual rate, PER is pensionable earnings at the time of retirement (which are
typically the individual’s average earnings in the last year or last few years
before retirement),   is the integration factor, and N is the number of years
that the individual has belonged to the scheme. From information in the
RS, we know N, the number of years the individual has belonged to the
scheme. However, we have to make reasonable assumptions about  Rt,
PER, and  .
The key distinction that we make is between individuals who work in the
public sector versus those in the private sector. We assume that diﬀerent
typical schemes apply in the two sectors with diﬀerent accrual rates, deﬁ-
nitions of pensionable earnings, and integration factors. This assumption,
and the choice of parameter values that we adopt, are based on informa-
tion from the 1997 (NAPF) Survey of Occupational Pension Funds (1998),
which shows a clear diﬀerence between public and private sector schemes
(see table 11.6).
We assume an accrual rate of one-sixtieth for private sector and one-
eightieth for public sector. For pensionable earnings, we take the best three
out of last ten years’ earnings for individuals working in the private sector
and the best single year’s earnings out of the last ten years for individuals
working in the public sector. We assume an integration factor of 1 for
private-sector schemes and 0 for public-sector schemes.
By construction, total occupational pension wealth—and accrual
rates—will vary across individuals according to whether they work in the
public or private sector. But there are other sources of variation in both to-
tal wealth and accrual rates. Total wealth will vary according to the num-
Pension Incentives and Pattern of Retirement in the United Kingdom 659ber of years that the individual has belonged to the scheme, while projected
earnings in the future will have an impact on expected total wealth and ac-
crual.
Further variation in accrual rates comes from diﬀerences across occu-
pational schemes in the age at which individuals are entitled to start draw-
ing their pension, which is also asked in the RS.14 We assume that people
can continue to accrue rights to occupational pensions beyond this age (up
to a maximum of forty years), but for each year that they continue to work
beyond this age, they lose a year’s pension. This is clearly a simpliﬁcation
of the actual rules of occupational pension schemes, and not least because,
around this time, many ﬁrms implemented early retirement schemes to en-
courage exits. With no information about the availability of these schemes
in the RS, we are almost certain not to capture the actual set of retirement
incentives facing some individuals. Even so, we do appear to estimate fairly
well the level of occupational pension income received in retirement. Table
11.7compares our estimates of individuals’ occupational pension with the
actual occupational pension they received, where this information is avail-
able (i.e., for individuals who had retired by the second wave of the RS and
660 Richard Blundell, Costas Meghir, and Sarah Smith
Table 11.6 Private versus Public Schemes





Deﬁnition of Pensionable Earnings
Actual earnings at retirement 11 2
Actual earnings at ﬁxed date 4 3
Average earnings over the last 12 months 23 9
Best year’s earnings within 3–10 years 25 86
Best 3 years’ earnings within 10–13 years 30
Other 7





Basic state pension 43 50
Lower earnings limit 55 50
Other 2
Source: NAPF (1998).
14. The survey asks “at what age will you start to receive the pension,” and then asks “is
that the usual age for drawing a pension,” which is true for 90 percent of respondents. Where
information on usual pension age is missing, we assume that it is sixty-ﬁve (the modal age).reported pension receipt). As with SERPS, we underpredict individuals’
total level of occupational pension income, but the correlation coeﬃcient
is positive, signiﬁcant, and high.
11.4.5 Total Pension Wealth and Accrual Measures
Identifying the eﬀects of incentive measures on retirement behavior re-
quires these measures to vary across individuals, over time, or both, con-
ditional on the other sociodemographic covariates that would be included
in a model of retirement. As the previous discussion of the construction of
the pension incentive measures has shown, there are a number of potential
sources of variation in total wealth and in the forward-looking accrual
measures for each of the four separate elements of the pension system.
Table 11.8 summarizes these sources of variation, indicating which of the
four elements of the system—the basic state pension, SERPS, occupa-
tional pension, and invalidity beneﬁt—is aﬀected and whether the source
drives variation in total pension wealth or forward-looking accrual mea-
sures (or both). Almost all of the sources of variation aﬀect both total pen-
sion wealth and accrual. However, future earnings will aﬀect forward-
looking accrual measures but not current total pension wealth, while total
wealth (but not accrual) varies with past earnings and with the individual’s
date of birth (in the case of individuals with SERPS).
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Table 11.7 Predicted and Actual Occupational Pensions
Actual occupational pension received in 1994 ($) 8,140
Imputed occupational pension in retirement year ($) 7,762
Correlation coeﬃcient 0.7868
No. of observations 172
Table 11.8 Sources of Variation in Pension Incentives Across Individuals
Wealth Accrual
Marital status and age of spouse (survivor’s beneﬁts) BSP, SERPS, OP ✓✓
Whether paid reduced-rate NI (married women) BSP, SERPS ✓✓
Whether spouse paid reduced-rate NI (married men) BSP, SERPS ✓✓
Past earnings SERPS, OP ✓
Future earnings SERPS, OP ✓
Date of birth SERPS ✓
Number of years with current employer OP ✓✓
Accrual rate—SERPS, public sector, private sector OP ✓✓
Pensionable earnings—public sector, private sector OP ✓✓
Normal retirement age OP ✓✓
Region, tenure, spouse’s employment, education, age IVB ✓✓
Note: BSP = basic state pension; OP = occupational pension; IVB = invalidity beneﬁt.In our analysis of the incentive eﬀects of pensions on retirement, three
diﬀerent forward-looking measures of accrual are used. The ﬁrst is simply
the one-period accrual—that is, how much an individual can add to their
total pension wealth by working this period. The second is peak value. This
represents the diﬀerence between total pension wealth accumulated by the
start of the period and the maximum total pension wealth an individual
could accumulate looking forward across all future years. This is a more
appropriate measure if it is assumed that labor market exits by older work-
ers are irreversible. In this case, when someone leaves the labor market,
they are giving up all possible future additions to their pension and will
therefore consider how much they could increase their pension by staying
in the labor market not just for this period, but in all future periods. By not
retiring now, individuals retain an option to retire in the future and,
thereby, to increase their pension. This is very similar in spirit to the option
value (Stock and Wise 1990), which is the third measure used.
In the option value model, individuals are assumed to compare the value
of retiring now to the maximum of the expected values of retiring at all fu-
ture ages, where the value of retiring at future ages includes both possible
pension additions and future earnings, that is,




   ∑
T
s r
 s t[kBs(r)] ,
where Y s is earnings and Bs retirement beneﬁts. The option value diﬀers
from the peak value by incorporating the future value of earnings until re-
tirement and by incorporating utility parameters k, the diﬀerential value of
income in leisure compared to earned income, and  , the coeﬃcient of rel-
ative risk aversion. In our calculation of option values we assume k   1.50
and   0.75. We assume a discount factor ( ) of 0.97 throughout.
Tables  11.9–11.11 summarizes the distribution of pension incentive
measures for men and women by age. These are calculated across all men
and women of the same age who remain in our sample (i.e., those who have
not yet exited the labor force) and will therefore be aﬀected by diﬀerential
selection into the sample at each age. All the ﬁgures are expressed in 1998
prices and in dollars.15
Table 11.9 summarizes pension incentive measures for men, pooling
those with and without an occupational pension. There is a clear eﬀect of
the state pension age—sixty-ﬁve for men—on the incentive measures. For
men over sixty-ﬁve, median accruals are negative and total pension wealth
starts to fall.16 It is worth pointing out that the selection eﬀects will tend to
increase average accrual measures—and reduce average total wealth—
662 Richard Blundell, Costas Meghir, and Sarah Smith
15. Assuming an exchange rate of $1.50 to £1.
16. Individuals can choose to defer their pension after the state pension ages. However,
since deferral is actuarially unfair for an average male and with no earnings test, we assume
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Table 11.9 Incentive Measures for Men ($1998 prices)
One-Year-Ahead Accrual
Wealth 10th 90th
Age Median Median Percentile Percentile SD N
56 89,821 3,017 1,164 7,796 4,402 31
57 93,850 2,544 970 13,862 5,335 64
58 97,320 3,137 1,301 13,819 6,537 104
59 103,990 3,146 1,115 13,248 5,142 133
60 108,244 2,932 1,026 9,099 3,927 155
61 113,266 2,829 791 7,947 3,577 170
62 117,994 2,781 692 8,886 5,095 162
63 123,886 3,080 182 9,560 4,645 144
64 127,333 3,326 801 9,254 4,545 124
65 128,514 –6,038 –10,570 –1,914 4,068 96
66 111,329 –5,976 –10,210 –3,525 2,546 36
67 84,831 –6,857 –9,859 –4,975 2,062 24
68 68,720 –7,162 –9,564 –4,826 1,695 17
69 43,102 –7,892 –9,277 –4,976 1,540 12
70 27,458 –7,864 –9,024 –4,826 1,799 4
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
56 15,936 3,209 37,966 13,088 10,476 5,375 13,813 3,268
57 12,766 2,377 37,675 25,228 8,857 4,237 12,711 3,270
58 12,764 2,650 31,027 18,650 7,449 3,524 11,162 2,938
59 10,916 1,666 24,728 10,250 6,168 2,920 10,581 3,047
60 8,824 1,190 23,424 9,974 5,034 2,332 9,083 2,975
61 7,234 884 19,690 8,447 4,060 1,675 7,938 2,821
62 5,118 653 14,313 6,227 2,745 1,214 7,165 2,652
63 2,993 182 8,541 4,355 1,615 534 6,316 2,298
64 3,269 770 9,091 4,471 1,072 268 4,864 2,085
65 –6,038 –10,570 –1,914 4,015 681 –298 5,089 2,380
66 –5,976 –10,210 –3,525 2,546 312 –207 4,190 1,851
67 –6,857 –9,859 –4,975 2,062 126 –283 3,616 1,831
68 –7,162 –9,564 –4,826 1,695 322 –418 4,629 1,875
69 –7,892 –9,277 –4,976 1,540 1,480 –219 6,041 2,369
70 –7,864 –9,024 –4,826 1,799 2,129 –585 3,466
Notes: SD = standard deviation; N = number of observations.
since those with lower accrual rates and higher total wealth will tend to exit
the labor market earlier and so drop out of the sample.
The peak values and option values yield more pronounced incentives for
people to stay in work at younger ages than the single period accruals. The
median option values remain positive up to age seventy, reﬂecting rela-
tively low replacement rates in the United Kingdom. With the assumption
that real earnings remain constant indeﬁnitely, this appears to create an in-centive for some individuals to carry on working even at older ages. This
will be reinforced by increasing selection of high-wage individuals into the
sample with age.
Table 11.10 compares the incentive measures for men with and without
occupational pensions. Figure 11.3 showed a clear diﬀerence in the labor
market exit behavior of these two groups; men with an occupational pen-
sion are more likely to stay in work at younger ages. Table 11.10 shows that
men with occupational pensions tend to have higher median peak values
and option values up to the state pension age, as well as higher wealth.
These incentives could work toward either earlier or later retirement. The
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Table 11.10 Incentive Measures for Men With or Without Occupational Pension
($, 1998 price
Peak Value Option Value
Age Median Wealth Median SD Median SD N
With Occupational Pension
56 89,813 20,617 12,318 11,060 2,429 22
57 94,818 16,313 28,814 9,509 2,873 44
58 100,479 15,433 20,429 8,128 2,745 77
59 106,350 12,622 10,697 7,041 3,042 95
60 111,982 10,424 10,793 5,858 3,098 112
61 115,244 8,406 9,287 4,898 2,984 123
62 119,875 6,407 6,956 3,742 2,858 113
63 129,065 3,932 4,940 2,443 2,466 102
64 129,262 4,906 5,033 1,301 2,326 86
65 134,894 –4,710 4,264 1,147 2,526 62
66 120,887 –5,248 1,630 1,795 1,941 18
67 88,656 –6,300 1,947 682 2,012 10
68 73,094 –7,162 1,622 340 1,760 7
69 45,510 –7,785 435 1,566 2,636 3
70 28,010 –9,024 2,441 1
Without Occupational Pension
56 94,040 3,636 7,777 5,585 2,474 9
57 81,424 4,374 6,166 4,976 2,488 20
58 89,181 5,658 4,944 4,776 2,133 27
59 92,931 4,403 4,931 4,002 1,756 38
60 98,296 4,267 4,116 3,358 1,342 43
61 105,402 3,949 3,277 2,543 1,129 47
62 110,036 2,575 2,185 1,727 964 49
63 116,857 1,373 1,145 863 573 42
64 122,692 1,576 1,174 926 1,010 38
65 126,471 –9,286 2,314 –45 1,104 34
66 103,687 –8,614 2,254 –29 1,334 18
67 82,364 –8,355 1,915 43 1,708 14
68 50,315 –7,550 1,832 305 2,045 10
69 41,864 –8,800 1,772 1,394 2,387 9
70 26,906 –7,760 1,757 1,817 2,037 3
Notes: SD = standard deviation; N = number of observations.observed pattern of exits suggests that the eﬀect of the higher option values
is likely to dominate, at least at younger ages, encouraging men with occu-
pational pensions to stay in employment. It is worth pointing out that al-
though the typical annual occupational pension is considerably higher than
the typical SERPS pension (comparing tables 11.5 and 11.7), the diﬀerence
between total pension wealth for people with occupational pensions and
those without is reduced by the more generous survivors’ beneﬁt provisions
of SERPS. In the case of SERPS, the surviving spouse inherits the pension
in full; in the case of occupational pensions, they inherit only half.17
Table 11.12 summarizes the incentive measures for women. The large
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Table 11.11 Incentive Measures for Women ($1998 prices)
Accrual
Wealth 10th 90th
Age Median Median Percentile Percentile SD N
56 3,018 0 0 7,200 5,905 38
57 4,633 0 0 9,841 6,809 68
58 2,324 0 0 8,081 5,203 98
59 4,124 0 0 6,739 6,068 114
60 1,231 0 –5,039 2,231 3,183 142
61 0 0 –4,888 2,089 3,316 107
62 604 0 –4,741 1,899 3,447 68
63 0 0 –4,599 1,409 3,703 43
64 303 0 –4,473 3,809 4,994 25
65 0 0 –4,413 631 2,135 17
66 19,916 154 0 307 217 2
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
56 0 0 35,228 18,676 6,191 2,028 12,753 3,855
57 0 0 29,180 15,825 5,646 647 11,485 3,720
58 0 0 20,693 10,208 4,910 421 10,868 3,343
59 0 0 17,108 10,558 4,277 322 9,254 3,070
60 0 –5,039 14,269 10,236 3,877 –308 8,858 3,609
61 0 –4,888 13,120 9,199 3,445 –346 8,208 3,349
62 0 –4,741 8,724 8,177 3,833 –391 7,901 3,219
63 0 –4,599 4,886 7,051 3,375 –295 6,149 2,707
64 0 –4,473 10,106 5,268 2,291 –329 5,119 2,456
65 0 –4,413 3,644 3,319 2,593 –377 4,472 1,840
66 39 0 78 55 3,427 3,005 3,848 596
Notes: SD = standard deviation; N = number of observations.
17. The survivors’ beneﬁt was due to be cut to half in SERPS from April 2001. However, in
the build-up to the preannounced reform many people were issued the wrong information in
the form of leaﬂets that did not refer to the reform. The change has been delayed to October
2002, and those who can show that they were misinformed will keep their original entitlement.number of zeros arises as a result of the number of married women who are
not eligible for a pension in their own right. This means that the median
single-period accruals and median peak accruals are all equal to zero. As
with men, the eﬀect of the state pension age is clear, with the tenth per-
centile single-period accruals and peak values turning negative at age sixty.
The ninetieth percentile peak values and option values remain positive af-
ter this age because of occupational pension schemes, which may have nor-
mal pension ages for women that are actually higher for women than their
state pension age.
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Table 11.12 The Probability of Male Retirement (1,276 observations)
Linear Age Cohort Dummies Age Dummies
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
Single Period Accruals
Excluding age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0999 .0183 .1158 .0197 .0915 .0196
Single-period accrual –.4975 .1574 –.8890 .1513 –.1251 .1761
Spouse wealth .0324 .0154 .0386 .0164 .0305 .0159
Pseudo R2 .1961 .1885 .2352
Log-likelihood –404.11 –407.93 –384.43
F test (PW, Accrual) 34.59 60.44 21.43
Including age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0699 .0188 .0861 .0206 .0825 .0201
Single-period accrual –.1954 .1623 –.6365 .1580 –.1144 .1769
Spouse wealth .0224 .0155 .0281 .0166 .0278 .0158
Penage dummy .1787 .0453 .1586 .0455
Pseudo R2 .2235 .2087 .2386
Log-likelihood –390.33 –397.77 –382.72
F test (PW, Accrual) 13.50 26.67 16.68
Peak Value
Excluding age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0883 .0173 .0999 .0192 .0892 .0192
Peak accrual –.0946 .0795 –.3170 .0780 –.0257 .0574
Spouse wealth .0296 .0152 .0297 .0166 .0293 .0157
Pseudo R2. .1866 .1670 .2348
Log-likelihood –408.88 –418.71 –384.62
F test (PW, Accrual) 25.81 40.54 21.10
Including age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0629 .0178 .0696 .0198 .0802 .0197
Peak accrual .0084 .0765 –.2025 .0786 –.0115 .0760
Spouse wealth .0194 .0153 .0199 .0167 .0266 .0157
Penage dummy .1991 .0452 .2012 .0471 .0962 .0636
Pseudo R2 .2220 .1987 .2382
Log-likelihood –391.07 –402.77 –382.92
F test (PW, Accrual) 12.09 16.75 16.3311.5 Estimated Pension Incentives and the Probability of Retirement
11.5.1 The Statistical Model
We estimate the impact of the incentive and wealth variables on retire-
ment decisions by modeling the conditional probability of exit from em-
ployment for individuals in the RS.
For each individual i, we write Dit   1 if the individual has left the labor
market in period t (conditional on being in the labor market in period t –
1). The probability of this event is then modeled as a function of observable
household and individual characteristics, as well as the pension incentive
variables. The pension incentive variables, deﬁned in the previous section,
are discounted wealth, option value (or single-period accrual), spouse’s
pension wealth, and the pension age. The latter measures the earliest age
at which someone can draw their pension. This varies not only across gen-
der, but also across type of pension plan. Denoting the observable charac-
teristics as Zit, and the pension incentive variables as Iit, our conditional
probability model may be expressed as
Pr(Dit   1)   G(a Zit   b Iit),
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Table 11.12 (continued)
Linear Age Cohort Dummies Age Dummies
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
Option Value
Excluding age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth 0.7706 .0205 .0509 .0206 .0750 .0213
Option value –.3619 .4196 –1.7598 .3675 –.6140 .4462
Spouse wealth .0244 .0153 .0188 .0165 .0267 .0158
Pseudo R2 .1858 .1731 .2366
Log-likelihood –409.25 –415.68 –383.72
F test (PW, Accrual) 25.06 44.58 22.71
Including age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0531 .0209 .0246 .0209 .0654 .0218
Option value –.3739 .4201 –1.5893 .3653 –.6397 .4460
Spouse wealth .0175 .0154 .0105 .0164 .0239 .0157
Penage dummy .1977 .0440 .2142 .0465 .0995 .0637
Pseudo R2 .2228 .2111 .2403
Log-likelihood –390.68 –396.54 –381.88
F test (PW, Accrual) 12.78 27.43 18.19
Notes: The full set of demographic controls include earnings (and earnings squared), education, health,
job tenure, industry, proportion of time spent in full-time employment, whether individual has an occu-
pational pension, housing tenure, ﬁnancial wealth, age diﬀerence within couples, spouse’s earnings,
spouse’s health, and whether spouse is retired. PW = pension wealth; SE = standard error.where G is the cumulative distribution function of unobservables in the
conditional exit model and a and b are unknown response coeﬃcients.
In estimation, we assume G is a cumulative standard normal and conse-
quently estimate aand busing a probit model for the conditional exit prob-
ability, pooled over all ﬁve years of retirement information in the RS. In
constructing the standard errors, we need to allow for dependence over
time in the unobservables for the same individual in the panel who survives
more than one period before retiring. This is implemented using the block
bootstrap method.
11.5.2 The Impact on Retirement
The discussion in section 11.4 has highlighted the sources of variation in
the pension incentive variables. We argue that there is suﬃcient variability
in the pension variables, conditional on the full set of other variables in-
cluded in the regressions. Generally it is diﬃcult to gauge how much vari-
ation one needs for a credible estimate—after all, this crucially depends on
the amount of variance in the errors. However, we note that, for our most
general speciﬁcation, 40 percent of total pension wealth in the case of men
and 43 percent of total pension wealth in the case of women remains un-
explained by all the other included regressors, including option values (see
table 11A.3 in appendix). For the option value, 24 percent of that for men
and 32 percent of that for women remains unexplained by the other regres-
sors, including total pension wealth. Overall, the pension variables, condi-
tional on our functional form assumptions and exclusion restrictions,
seem to display suﬃcient variability.
Turning to the conditional exit probability estimates, table 11.12 pre-
sents the marginal eﬀects and standard errors from a probit regression for
a variety of speciﬁcations estimated using data on our sample of men in the
RS. Table 11.13 provides the equivalent estimates for women. The results
are separated into three panels (single accrual, peak value, and option
value) according to the speciﬁcation of the incentive variable. These are
precisely as deﬁned in the previous section and, in particular, allow for the
basic pension, SERPS, and occupational schemes where the individual is
eligible. They also allow for eligibility to invalidity beneﬁt according to the
assigned probability model described in section 11.4.3.
The columns in each panel diﬀer according to the speciﬁcation of age
eﬀects. In the ﬁrst column, a linear age term is allowed. It may be that all
other age eﬀects are simply due to the wealth and pension incentives, in
which case this speciﬁcation will be adequate. However, given that we are
mixing diﬀerent date of birth cohorts in this survey and that age eﬀects may
represent preferences as well as incentives, the next two columns allow for
alternative age speciﬁcations. The second column includes a date-of-birth-
cohort dummy and the ﬁnal column includes a full set of age dummies.
Each panel is further separated according to whether a dummy for the
668 Richard Blundell, Costas Meghir, and Sarah Smithage at which individuals become eligible to receive a pension is included—
the “pension age.” For recipients of the basic state pension and SERPS,
this is the normal state pension age (sixty-ﬁve for men and sixty for
women). For individuals with an occupational pension, we use the age at
which they are entitled to start drawing their occupational pension.18 This
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Table 11.13 The Probability of Female Retirement (722 observations)
Linear Age Cohort Dummies Age Dummies
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
Single Period Accruals
Excluding age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0677 .0274 .0726 .0283 .0568 .0265
Single-period accrual –.3856 .3243 –.5986 .3300 –.0744 .3142
Spouse wealth .0343 .0172 .0344 .0177 .0346 .0167
Pseudo R2 .1085 .1025 .1407
Log-likelihood –285.17 –287.09 –274.86
F test (PW, Accrual) 6.23 7.60 4.92
Including age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0536 .0269 .0590 .0282 .0536 .0266
Single-period accrual –.1176 .3212 –.3857 .3307 –.0391 .3164
Spouse wealth .0308 .0168 –.0317 .0175 .0334 .0167
Penage dummy .1309 .0405 .1077 .0400 .0546 .0644
Pseudo R2 .1291 .1165 .1420
Log-likelihood –278.58 –282.62 –274.44
F test (PW, Accrual) 4.12 4.57 4.48
Peak Value
Excluding age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0564 .0255 .0557 .0263 .0551 .0250
Peak accrual –.2848 .1683 –.3934 .1706 –.2212 .1572
Spouse wealth .0313 .0171 .0303 .0176 .0329 .0167
Pseudo R2 .1111 .1065 .1440
Log-likelihood –284.33 –285.80 –273.83
F test (PW, Accrual) 7.72 9.70 6.76
Including age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0503 .0252 .0482 .0262 .0534 .0251
Peak accrual –.1930 .1638 –.3277 .1682 –.2046 .1588
Spouse wealth .0292 .0168 .0286 .0175 .0322 .0167
Penage dummy .1268 .0397 .1070 .0392 .0430 .0631
Pseudo R2 .1312 .1209 .1448
Log-likelihood –277.90 –281.21 –273.56
F test (PW, Accrual) 5.35 7.04 6.05
(continued) 
18. The results presented in the tables in this section focus only on the pension measures. A
full result for a limited number of speciﬁcations are presented in table 11A.3. For example,
table 11A.5 shows the eﬀect of other demographic and economic characteristics on the prob-
ability of retirement.varies across individuals in occupational pension schemes so that it has po-
tential explanatory power even when added to the speciﬁcation with the
full set of age dummies in the ﬁnal column.
A broad look across the results in Table 11.12 is quite encouraging for
the retirement model. In all cases, the pension wealth and incentive vari-
ables are jointly signiﬁcant. In all but one of the eighteen speciﬁcations, the
signs are as we would expect—a positive wealth eﬀect and a negative ac-
crual eﬀect. These results are consistent with the presence of both income
and substitution eﬀects in retirement decisions.19 The positive coeﬃcient
on the total pension wealth variable points to an income eﬀect, whereby in-
dividuals who accumulate a lot in earlier years retire earlier. The impact of
the option value reﬂects future opportunities foregone by stopping work-
ing now; the negative coeﬃcient on this term indicates that the greater
those foregone opportunities, the less likely individuals are to retire. Since
the incentive variables are measured in $100,000, the coeﬃcient of –0.6397
on the option value in the ﬁnal column, for example, implies that a $10,000
rise in the option values (leaving pension wealth unaﬀected) reduces the
probability of retirement by a little over 6 percentage points. The counter-
670 Richard Blundell, Costas Meghir, and Sarah Smith
Table 11.13 (continued)
Linear Age Cohort Dummies Age Dummies
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
Option Value
Excluding age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0470 .0292 .0277 .0291 .0463 .0284
Option value –.4044 .6307 –1.2782 .6113 –.3528 .6029
Spouse wealth .0322 .0172 .0298 .0176 .0366 .0167
Pseudo R2 .1069 .1042 .1412
Log-likelihood –285.69 –286.55 –274.72
F test (PW, Accrual) 5.38 8.78 5.22
Including age ﬁrst eligible
Pension wealth .0429 .0289 .0205 .0290 .0452 .0284
Option value –.2992 .6195 –1.2237 .6073 –.3112 .6045
Spouse wealth .0297 .0168 .0168 .0275 .0326 .0167
Penage dummy .1334 .0397 .1150 .0393 .0531 .0640
Pseudo R2 .1293 .1208 .1424
Log-likelihood –278.53 –281.23 –274.31
F test (PW, Accrual) 4.26 7.28 4.73
Note: The full set of demographic controls include earnings (and earnings squared), education, health,
job tenure, industry, proportion of time spent in full-time employment, whether individual has an occu-
pational pension, housing tenure, ﬁnancial wealth, age diﬀerence within couples, spouse’s earnings,
spouse’s health, and whether spouse is retired. PW = pension wealth; SE = standard error.
19. The option value and total pension wealth measures are in hundred-thousands while
net earnings are in thousands.factual simulations in the next section are intended to shed more light on
what these magnitudes are likely to mean in reality.
The signiﬁcance of these coeﬃcients requires some discussion. The
panel nature of the survey means that the standard errors calculated from
the standard formula for the probit model will not account for the de-
pendence across time periods. In table 11A.9, we present bootstrap con-
ﬁdence intervals that do allow for this dependence. Interestingly, these
intervals maintain the signiﬁcance found in the wealth and incentive
variables in table 11.10.
A more detailed examination of table 11.12 reveals some further inter-
esting features. On pure likelihood grounds, the speciﬁcations that include
the option value dominate speciﬁcations with the more ad hoc incentive
variables. The dummy for the age at which the pension is ﬁrst eligible is typ-
ically signiﬁcant, although slightly less so for the option value speciﬁca-
tions. The inclusion of date-of-birth-cohort eﬀects, in the second column
of each panel, tends to reduce the impact of the wealth variables. This
seems consistent with the strong diﬀerences in wealth across cohorts. At
the same time, it leads to a strong increase in the incentive variable. Indeed,
for the peak value speciﬁcations, it is the only case where the incentive vari-
able remains signiﬁcant.
Including a completely unrestricted set of age eﬀects reduces the magni-
tude of the substitution eﬀect, although the wealth eﬀect remains positive
and signiﬁcant. As we saw in the previous section, the option value has
quite a lot of variation, even after including a full set of age eﬀects. The es-
timates for the option value that also include the pension age dummy are
the preferred (on the grounds of likelihood) and yield a marginally signiﬁ-
cant option value coeﬃcient, albeit much reduced from the cohort dummy
speciﬁcation. Interestingly, the block bootstrap standard errors reported
in table 11A.6 show a 95 percent interval that remains negative, suggesting
a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect even in this speciﬁcation with age eﬀects and
the pension age dummy.
Figure 11.6compares the within-sample predictive performance of these
model speciﬁcations. A number of immediate features stand out. First,
even without including a full set of age dummies, we manage to predict a
large amount of retirement before state pension age (sixty-ﬁve). This is due
to the impact of invalidity beneﬁt and early retirement incentives in the
occupational systems. Second, the linear-age and cohort-eﬀects speciﬁ-
cations completely fail to capture the spike at sixty-ﬁve. Note that these
speciﬁcations do not include the age ﬁrst eligible to pension variable—we
discuss this speciﬁcation in more detail in our simulation of pension re-
forms. The linear-age eﬀects speciﬁcation does not manage to capture the
downturn in retirement hazards that occurs after sixty-ﬁve.
The retirement model results for women, presented in table 11.13, are sim-
ilar to those for men, although the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is typically
smaller. For the majority of women, their decision to continue working—
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their own pension scheme, since they do not receive a pension in their own
right. A lot of the identiﬁcation of incentive eﬀects is likely to come from ex-
ploiting variation between the set of women who do have their own pension
and those who do not. In practice, however, these two groups of women are
likely to diﬀer in several other key respects, which makes it diﬃcult to mea-
sure the pension incentive eﬀects with a high degree of accuracy.
Very few of the other included demographic and economic variables are
individually signiﬁcant (see table 11A.5). Among those that are signiﬁ-
cant—for both men and women—are self-reported health status at the
time of the ﬁrst interview, the retirement status of the spouse (someone is
more likely to retire if their spouse is already retired), and whether or not
someone has an outstanding mortgage, which tends to reduce the proba-
bility of retirement. This is consistent with the idea that people might carry
on working in order to pay oﬀ their mortgage. Typically, the occupational
pension dummy is positive and signiﬁcant. This might reﬂect unmeasured
incentives arising from occupational pension rules or the fact that people
tend to select jobs with occupational pension schemes according to their
underlying preferences for early retirement.
11.5.3 Evidence for Liquidity Constraints
An interesting feature of the results in tables 11.12 and 11.13 is the sig-
niﬁcance of the pension age dummy. One possibility is that, prior to the age
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Fig. 11.6 Actual and predicted retirement hazards (option value)at which individuals become entitled to start drawing their pension, they
are liquidity constrained and unable to borrow against their future pension
wealth, even if it is quite large.20 Reaching pension age and being able to
start drawing their pension therefore may have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
probability of retirement in addition to the incentive eﬀects. Table 11.14 is
an attempt to examine this.
The ﬁrst panel considers the complete sample of men used in table 11.12
and includes two new variables—LiqPenW and LiqOV. These variables
calculate wealth and incentives assuming that pension wealth only matters
at the time the individual becomes entitled to start drawing on the pension
income. Because individuals cannot directly draw on their wealth before
this age, it is maybe assumed not to matter for retirement decisions.
Pension Incentives and Pattern of Retirement in the United Kingdom 673
Table 11.14 Evidence of Liquidity Constraints (men)
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
All Men (N = 1,276)
Pension wealth .0282 .0195 .0371 .0202
Option value –1.5592 .3650 –.3572 .4390
LiqPenW –.0083 .0195 .0039 .0190
LiqOV –1.4586 .3975 –1.6173 .3443
Log-likelihood –397.33 –387.79 –390.63
Financial Wealth  £3,000 (N = 757)
Pension wealth –.0186 .0255 –.0096 .0307
Option value –2.3928 .4741 –1.7453 .6182
LiqPenW –.0012 .0266 –.0096 .0241
LiqOV –.6366 .5145 –1.5393 .4244
Log-likelihood –208.54 –207.07 –211.72
With Occupational Pension (N = 875)
Pension wealth .0509 .0239 .0587 .0250
Option value –1.5178 .4270 –.1866 .5295
LiqPenW –.0102 .0228 .0060 .0255
LiqOV –1.7021 .5054 –1.8349 .4317
Log-likelihood –293.12 –285.33 –288.86
With No Educational Qualiﬁcations (N = 561)
Pension wealth –.0338 .0597 .0388 .0655
Option value–2.4158 .7419 –.1174 .9399
LiqPenW –.0558 .0595 .0470 .0568
LiqOV –2.9933 .9198 –3.0554 .7341
Log-likelihood –184.33 –176.77 –177.10
Notes: Controls included for demographics, earnings, cohort dummies, and age of ﬁrst enti-
tlement to pension. SE = standard error; N = number of observations.
20. It may well also be the case that they are uncertain about the amount they will receive.
Although this should not be the case for state pension incomes.At ﬁrst sight, this hypothesis seems quite plausible. However, the results
presented in table 11.14 are mixed. The LiqPenW variable, which is where
one might think the dominant impact of such an eﬀect would occur, is
never signiﬁcant, and the original pension wealth variable always domi-
nates. Perhaps the impact would be more important for those with smaller
amounts of ﬁnancial wealth. The second panel does not lend support to
this. Here we just select those with ﬁnancial wealth holdings less than
£3,000. There is no noticeable impact of the liquidity measures of pension
wealth.
Why should this be? One fact that we have pointed out is the low value
of the state pension for most of those eligible for state pension. For many
they will have their incomes in retirement topped up by welfare beneﬁts.
Moreover, if they retire before the state pension age, they will often be eli-
gible for disability beneﬁts and will receive an income much like the state
pension. Their net incomes from employment as they age will stay quite
stable and they have little reason to save or borrow. Moreover, since those
eligible for state pension are typically lower skilled, their earnings in work
are also quite low. The consequence is that their net replacement rates are
little under 100 percent. Although they may implicitly face liquidity con-
straints, these are never binding and therefore have no impact on retire-
ment decisions.
The remaining panels of table 11.14 further investigate the evidence for
liquidity eﬀects among those with occupational pensions and also those
with lower educational qualiﬁcations. Again, in neither case is there much
evidence that such constraints are binding on the retirement decision.
11.6 Counterfactual Simulations
To illustrate the size of the estimated incentive eﬀects on retirement be-
havior, we consider the eﬀects of reforms to the pension system on the pre-
dicted probabilities of retirement at diﬀerent ages. Two alternative scenar-
ios are considered.
The ﬁrst counterfactual is to increase the pension age for everyone by
three years. This means that the state pension age is sixty-eight for men and
sixty-three for women. We also augment the normal occupational pension
retirement ages by three years. There is clearly a correspondence in prac-
tice between the state pension ages and the normal retirement ages in oc-
cupational pension schemes, so increasing the state pension is likely to
have a knock-on eﬀect on occupational pension schemes. Moreover, the
underlying demographic pressures that are likely to cause the government
to reduce the generosity of the state pension system will have a similar
eﬀect on occupational schemes.
The second counterfactual assumes a pension system of the following
form.
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• A normal retirement age of sixty-ﬁve
• A 60 percent replacement rate at age sixty-ﬁve
• A 6 percent actuarial adjustment from sixty to seventy
• no other pathways to retirement
The eﬀects of each of these alternative scenarios on the distribution of
total pension wealth and option values by age are presented in table 11.15.
We report results for men only since the majority of women, who have no
pension in their own right, will be unaﬀected.
The eﬀect of raising the retirement age is to reduce the median level of
total pension wealth and to increase option values, compared to the exist-
ing pension system. The income and substitution eﬀects work in the same
direction, and the combined eﬀect is to reduce the conditional probability
of retirement at younger ages. The eﬀects can most clearly be seen by plot-
ting and comparing the predicted retirement probabilities under the base
case of the existing pension system and under the reform. This is done in
Figure 11.7, corresponding to the one-period accruals and option values
respectively.
The precise magnitude of the eﬀects of reforming the pension system de-
pend on which speciﬁcation is used. When a full set of age dummies is in-
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Table 11.15 Incentive Measures: The Impact of Reform (men, 1,272 observations)
Base Reform 1 Reform 2
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Age TW OV TW OV TW OV
56 89,821 10,476 76,862 13,353 102,841 13,660
57 93,850 8,857 80,639 11,785 101,072 13,019
58 97,320 7,449 83,564 10,320 105,531 12,880
59 103,990 6,168 88,016 9,430 113,593 13,200
60 108,244 5,034 90,293 8,084 116,247 13,384
61 113,266 4,060 93,686 7,113 119,261 11,962
62 117,994 2,745 97,107 6,046 118,727 11,112
63 123,886 1,615 101,717 5,252 127,663 10,182
64 127,333 1,072 103,070 4,229 125,523 9,768
65 128,514 681 105,048 3,021 121,037 9,151
66 111,329 312 114,466 1,544 131,675 8,332
67 84,831 126 111,553 1,034 115,668 7,007
68 68,720 322 109,707 –119 115,164 6,211
69 43,102 1,480 82,729 –138 105,251 4,574
70 27,458 2,129 67,553 –217 71,404 2,990
Notes:OV = option value; TW = total wealth. Reform 1 raises the pension age by three years;
reform 2 introduced a pension system with a 60% replacement rate at the normal pension age




























































































)cluded these tend to dominate any of the pension wealth and accrual in-
centives and the eﬀect of reforming the pension system appears to be very
small. To the extent that the age dummies pick up the incentive eﬀects,
these would need to be adjusted to reﬂect the pivotal ages in the new sys-
tem. The bottom-right-hand graph in ﬁgure 11.7 shows the eﬀect of chang-
ing the “pension age.”
When a set of cohort dummies is included, the eﬀect of the forward-
looking accrual and option value measures is much stronger—as was seen
from the regression results in the previous section, and this is reﬂected in
bigger predicted responses from increasing the retirement age by three
years. Looking at ﬁgure 7, panel A, which shows the retirement probabili-
ties based on the one-period-ahead accrual, the eﬀect is to halve the pre-
dicted probability of retirement at sixty-ﬁve. Including option values tends
to smooth the eﬀects over a longer period, as would be expected from a
more forward-looking model. The probability of retirement is reduced by
between 3–7 percentage points between the ages of sixty and sixty-six.
The eﬀect of the second simulated reform is to increase the level of pen-
sion wealth and to increase the option values, compared to the existing sys-
tem. Under the simulated reform, the level of annual pension income that
the simulated pension system produces is relatively generous compared to
the existing U.K. system. The option value eﬀect is reinforced by the ab-
sence of any nonpension beneﬁts (such as disability beneﬁts) before retire-
ment age under the simulated reform which increases the incentive to stay
in work.
The eﬀect on one-period accruals is slightly diﬀerent and worth com-
menting on. Under the simulated reform, everyone is granted a full enti-
tlement at age sixty and the level of pension is determined on the basis of
earnings at age sixty-ﬁve. Therefore, the decision to continue working, be-
fore age sixty, has no eﬀect on pension entitlement, and up until age sixty,
the one-period-ahead accrual is zero. Only after age sixty is the one-period
accrual positive (and higher than under the existing system). If the decision
to leave work were reversible, then the optimal thing to do in terms of max-
imizing pension beneﬁts might be to leave work until age sixty and then
reenter to increase pension entitlements. The option value approach im-
plicitly rules this out, and before age sixty gives a positive value to the op-
tion to increase pension value by working between sixty-one and sixty-two.
The eﬀects of this can be seen from the simulated retirement probabili-
ties in ﬁgure 11.7. Looking at the simulations with cohort dummies and
the one-period-ahead accruals, the probability of retirement before age
sixty is higher under the case of the second reform than it is in the base case.
This reﬂects the higher level of pension wealth and the lower (eﬀectively
zero) accrual rate. After age sixty, however, the one-period accrual is posi-
tive and higher than under the existing system. The income and substitu-
tion eﬀects now work in the opposite direction, with the substitution eﬀect
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form. The option value makes the higher substitution eﬀect count at
younger ages, and the probability of retirement is reduced at all ages.
11.7 Summary and Conclusions
The United Kingdom experienced a serious decline in labor market at-
tachment among older workers in the 1980s and 1990s. This was especially
acute among men aged ﬁfty-ﬁve or older. The analysis we present shows
that during the two recessions—the ﬁrst in the early 1980s and the second
in the early 1990s, the fraction of such men in employment declined by
more than 30 percentage points to record-low levels of little over 50 per-
cent and has shown no sign of recovery. For older women this decline was
less evident, reﬂecting the growing participation rate among younger co-
horts that oﬀsets the decline in employment. To what extent can these low
levels of labor market attachment be attributed to the workings of the U.K.
pension system and to what extent can these trends be reversed by reforms
to this system? These questions formed the motivation for this study.
We began the paper with a comprehensive evaluation of the economic in-
centives for retirement underlying the U.K. pension system. This accounted
for the changing impact of the SERPS, introduced in 1978 and of growing
importance for those retiring in the 1990s. It also accounted for the complex
set of private deﬁned-beneﬁt occupation pension schemes, which provided
coverage for nearly 70 percent of those approaching retirement in the 1990s.
We highlighted the importance of invalidity beneﬁt as a mechanism for in-
come support in early retirement whose take-up approached nearly 1.5 mil-
lion among individuals below state retirement age in the 1990s.
To examine the impact of these factors on retirement, we used a sample
of individuals aged ﬁfty-ﬁve or older from the U.K. RS. Their retirement
probability was modeled in terms of the incentives underlying their own
pension plans and other socioeconomic factors. Our analysis followed an
option value approach and allows a separate role for pension wealth. We
also allowed for the spouse’s economic and demographic characteristics.
The estimation results pointed to signiﬁcant incentive and wealth eﬀects
through the pension system. The magnitude of these turned out to be quite
sensitive to the speciﬁcation of age eﬀects. To allow for this, we considered
three basic speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst restricted age eﬀects to enter linearly.
This is clearly rejected by the data in favor of more general speciﬁcations
but we retain it as a baseline speciﬁcation. The second allowed for cohort
eﬀects, and the third allowed for a complete set of age dummies. Not sur-
prisingly, the full set of age dummies was found to provide the best ﬁt; but
even in this case, the wealth and incentive variables remained correctly
signed and signiﬁcant. Overall the option value model performed better
than models that used simpler and more ad hoc incentive measures.
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explain the large increase in the retirement at the normal retirement age
(sixty-ﬁve for men and sixty for women). This explained the much im-
proved ﬁt of the age dummy speciﬁcation. Nonetheless, the incentive and
wealth variables alone managed to explain the most part of large amount
of early retirement that occurs prior to the normal retirement age. This ap-
peared to be due to a combination of the ability for invalidity beneﬁt to act
as an early retirement incentive and the signiﬁcant incentives for early re-
tirement that occur in occupational schemes in the United Kingdom. To
explain the spike in the exit probability at the normal retirement age, we in-
cluded a dummy for the age at which the individual could ﬁrst draw down
their pension. This variable was shown to contain variation over and above
the age dummies because this age varied across occupational schemes.
Even with this variable included, the option value incentive and pension
wealth variables remained signiﬁcant. We also investigated whether or not
the signiﬁcance of this variable could be attributed to a liquidity eﬀect—
that is, a wealth eﬀect that only became important at the point at which the
pension could be drawn. We found little success in this explanation.
Each of these speciﬁcations was used to simulate two policy reforms.
The ﬁrst—reform 1—involved an increase by three years in the pension
age. The second—reform 2—was more complex. This later reform had an
early retirement age at sixty with a normal retirement at age sixty-ﬁve. This
was matched by a 60 percent replacement rate at sixty-ﬁve and a 6 percent
actuarial adjustment from sixty to seventy. Finally, all other pathways to
retirement were eliminated. Reform 1 had a clear impact on retirement in
all speciﬁcations—moving the retirement peak to a later age and signiﬁ-
cantly cutting the incidence of early retirement. Reform 2 had an even
more dramatic impact on early retirement, resulting in a smooth and lower
rate of exit into retirement at all ages.
As a more cautious ﬁnal note, it should be pointed out that the data
source we used had a number of drawbacks. Most notably, the high attri-
tion between waves and the resulting small sample size used in our analysis.
In addition, many of the features of the occupational plans that we would
like to include are missing from the data. More optimistically, the new En-
glish Longitudinal Survey of Ageing, which will produce the ﬁrst wave in
December 2003, will remedy both of these defects and will also provide a
comprehensive and detailed data source on health and retirement.
680 Richard Blundell, Costas Meghir, and Sarah SmithPension Incentives and Pattern of Retirement in the United Kingdom 681
Appendix
Table 11A.1 Calculating SERPS using Accrual Rates, Earnings Factors, and 
Upper- and Lower-Earnings Limits (UEL, LEL, respectively)
Accrual Rate on Earnings
Year of Retirement Between 1978–79 and 1987–88 1988–89 Onwards
Before 1998–99 25-20 = 1.25 25-20 = 1.25
2000–01 25-21= 1.19 25-21 = 1.19
2005–06 25-26 = 0.96 22.5-26 = 0.87
2010–11 25-31 = 0.81 20-31 = 0.65
2015–16 25-36 = 0.69 20-36 = 0.56
2020–21 25-41 = 0.61 20-41 = 0.49
2025–26 25-46 = 0.54 20-46 = 0.431
2027–28 onwards 25-49 = 0.51 20-49 = 0.41
Year of Earnings Factor (%) Year of Earnings Factor (%)
1978–79 377 1988–89 69.5
1979–80 320.7 1989–90 53.5
1980–81 251.6 1990–91 43.1
1981–82 194.8 1991–92 30
1982–83 167.6 1992–93 22.1
1983–84 148 1993–94 16.3
1984–85 129.6 1994–95 11.7
1985–86 115.5 1995–96 8
1986–87 97.9 1996–97 5
1987–88 84.4
Year LEL UEL Year LEL UEL
1978–79 17.5 120 1988–89 41 305
1979–80 19.5 135 1989–90 43 325
1980–81 23.0 165 1990–91 46 350
1981–82 27 200 1991–92 52 390
1982–83 29.5 220 1992–93 54 405
1983–84 32.5 235 1993–94 56 420
1984–85 34 250 1994–95 57 430
1985–86 35.5 265 1995–96 58 440
1986–87 38 285 1996–97 61 455
1987–88 39 295 1997–98 62 465Table 11A.2 Probit Results, Invalidity Beneﬁt
Men Women
Coeﬃcient SE Coeﬃcient SE
Yorks and Humberside –.0958 .0748 –.1601 .1129
Northwest .0217 .0713 .2176 .0989
East Midlands –.4242 .0857 –.2936 .1256
West Midlands –.3005 .0773 –.3128 .1155
East Anglia –.6051 .1189 –.4210 .1700
South East –.5109 .0835 –.2288 .1165
Greater London –.5336 .0731 –.4302 .1101
South West –.4568 .0852 –.3078 .1253
Wales .2494 .0809 .3606 .1088
Scotland .0179 .0743 .2237 .0998
Age .5859 .0246 .4968 .0354
Age2 –.0054 .0002 –.0048 .0003
College education –.6891 .0962 –.0452 .1019
Spouse employed .1476 .0416 –.1923 .0467
Homeowner with mortgage .0109 .0484 –.0529 .0614
Outright owner –.0850 .0399 –.2829 .0595
Constant –15.7892 .6933 –13.5498 .9405
No. of observations 9,363 14,192
Pseudo R2 0.2047 0.2013
Source: Data from the Family Expenditure Survey (U.K. Data Archive 1996) for the period
from April 1988 to March 1994.
Note: SE = standard error.Table 11A.3 Regression Results
Dependent Variable
Total Pension
Wealth Accrual Peak Value Option Value
A. Wealth and Accrual, Men (1,276 observations)
Option value –8.971 .5268
Total pension wealth .0326 .0027 .0382 .0064 –.0211 .0012
Spouse pension wealth –.2272 .0189 .0114 .0021 .0107 .0050 –.0042 .0009
Diﬀerence in ages .0299 .0026 .0001 .0002 .0036 .0006 .0016 .0001
Job tenure .0072 .0018 .0000 .0002 .0014 .0004 .0000 .0000
% of full-time employment .0765 .0464 .0041 .0049 –.0189 .0117 .0016 .0022
Education .1296 .0229 .0016 .0024 .0032 .0058 .0021 .0011
Health score .0089 .0126 –.0001 .0013 .0033 .0031 –.0008 .0006
Spouse health score .0094 .0075 –.0006 .0008 –.0018 .0018 –.0011 .0003
Renter –.0205 .0279 .0034 .0029 –.0012 .0070 .0017 .0013
Mortgage .2254 .0269 .0044 .0029 .0137 .0069 .0045 .0013
Industry, engineering –.1137 .0415 .0066 .0044 –.0145 .0104 .0046 .0020
Industry, manufacturing –.0927 .0425 –.0039 .0045 –.0400 .0107 –.0002 .0020
Industry, distribution –.0401 .0413 .0031 .0044 –.0226 .0103 .0005 .0020
Industry, services .0205 .0404 .0012 .0043 –.0265 .0101 .0001 .0019
Industry, government .3681 .0541 –.0016 .0058 –.0476 .0138 –.0030 .0026
Spouse retired –.0146 .0365 –.0072 .0039 –.0061 .0091 –.0011 .0017
Occupational pension .1923 .0271 .0177 .0028 .0355 .0066 .0149 .0012
£1–£3,000 wealth –.0727 .0309 .0060 .0033 .0136 .0077 .0058 .0014
£3,000–£10,000 wealth –.0039 .0350 .0136 .0037 .0297 .0087 .0060 .0016
 £10,000 wealth .3155 .0404 .0236 .0042 .0642 .0099 .0202 .0019
Missing wealth –.0010 .0557 .0111 .0059 .0133 .0140 .0046 .0027
Earnings .0272 .0019 .0001 .000 .0003 .0004 .0020 .0000
Spouse earnings .0025 .0019 –.0008 .0002 –.0015 .0004 –.0003 .0000
Pension age .4908 .0623 –.0166 .0068 –.0704 .0160 –.0012 .0031
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .6054 .5976 .4890 .7597
B. Wealth and Accrual, Women (722 observations)
Option value –10.84 .6996
Total pension wealth .0329 .0027 .0183 .0064 –.0238 .0015
Spouse pension wealth –.1515 .0211 .0031 .0018 –.0022 .0043 –.0013 .0010
Diﬀerence in ages .0132 .0063 –.0007 .0005 –.0023 .0012 –.0005 .0003
Job tenure –.0033 .0023 –.0003 .0001 –.0010 .0004 –.0001 .0001
% of Full-Time employment .2429 .0631 .0110 .0054 .0468 .0126 –.0007 .0029
Education .1602 .0396 .0087 .0033 .0324 .0078 .0044 .0018
Health score –.0228 .0170 –.0019 .0014 –.0033 .0033 –.0014 .0007
Spouse health score –.0029 .0164 .0010 .0013 –.0010 .0032 .0005 .0007
Renter .0246 .0485 –.0055 .0041 –.0160 .0095 –.0015 .0022
Mortgage .0890 .0402 .0026 .0034 .0118 .0079 .0015 .0018
Industry, engineering –.3168 .1006 –.0133 .0085 –.0065 .0199 .0076 .0047
Industry, manufacturing –.1573 .0771 –.0348 .0065 –.0486 .0152 –.0065 .0036
Industry, distribution –.2116 .0747 –.0259 .0063 –.0341 .0148 –.0029 .0035
Industry, services –.0207 .0648 –.0195 .0054 –.0107 .0128 .0008 .0030




Wealth Accrual Peak Value Option Value
Occupational pension .4871 .0466 .0159 .0041 .0865 .0095 .0160 .0022
£1–£10,000 wealth .0245 .0482 –.0122 .0040 –.0250 .0094 –.0054 .0022
£3,000–£10,000 wealth –.1071 .0574 –.0106 .0048 –.0200 .0113 –.0048 .0026
 £10,000 wealth .2858 .0644 –.0101 .0055 –.0019 .0129 .0006 .0030
Missing wealth –.1200 .0835 –.0139 .0070 –.0243 .0164 –.0063 .0039
Earnings .0343 .0045 .0004 .0003 –.0003 .0007 .0036 .0001
Spouse earnings –.0097 .0019 –.0001 .0001 –.0010 .0003 –.0002 .0000
Pension age .0759 .0827 –.0183 .0070 –.0560 .0163 –.0056 .0038
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .5683 .4833 .4546 .6795
Table 11A.4 Retirement Probabilities: One-Year Accrual, Men (1,276 observations)
Demographics, Demographics, 
Earnings, and  Earnings, and 
Cohort Dummies Age Dummies No Controls Demographics
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
A. Not Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension
Pension wealth .1024 .0158 .1152 .0189 .1128 .0185 .0888 .0180
Accrual –1.1481 .1514 –1.1869 .1512 –.8903 .1519 –.1153 .1768
Spouse wealth .0176 .0167 .0367 .0167 .0380 .0163 .0302 .0157
Net earnings .0001 .0013 .0003 .0012
Pseudo R2 .0786 .1435 .1869 .2337
Log-likelihood –463.2 –430.5 –408.7 385.2
F test (PW, Accrual) 76.71 83.25 61.87 24.29
B. Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension (Penage)
Pension wealth .0638 .0166 .0812 .0193 .0853 .0192 .0802 .0185
Accrual –.6461 .1632 –.7627 .1604 –.6342 .1588 –.1049 .1777
Spouse wealth .0062 .0166 .0254 .0167 .0283 .0165 .0276 .0156
Penage dummy .2649 .0498 .2205 .0484 .1594 .0455 .0955 .0634
Net earnings .0004 .0013 .0004 .0012
Pseudo R2 .1229 .1831 .2074 .2370
Log-likelihood –440.9 –410.1 –390.4 –383.5
F test (PW, Accrual) 21.33 29.50 27.76 18.71
Note: SE = standard error.Table 11A.5 Retirement Probabilities: Peak Values, Men (1,276 observations)
Demographics, Demographics, 
Earnings, and  Earnings, and 
Cohort Dummies Age Dummies No Controls Demographics
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
A. Not Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension
Pension wealth .0851 .0150 .0923 .0181 .0982 .0179 .0868 .0175
Peak value –.5018 .0766 –.5054 .0759 –.3211 .0779 –.0283 .0764
Spouse wealth .0114 .0167 .0246 .0168 .0296 .0165 .0290 .0155
Net earnings .0004 .0013 .0002 .0012
Pseudo R2 .0625 .1225 .1662 .2334
Log-likelihood –471.3 –441.1 –419.1 –385.4
F test (PW, Accrual) 59.96 62.50 42.61 24.08
B. Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension (Penage)
Pension wealth .0514 .0155 .0628 .0183 .0702 .0185 .0780 .0181
Peak value –.2689 .0793 –.3041 .0777 –.2045 .0787 –.0141 .0763
Spouse wealth .0022 .0165 .0167 .0166 .0206 .0165 .0264 .0155
Penage dummy .2935 .0489 .2602 .0485 .2007 .0470 .0953 .0635
Net earnings ..0006 .0013 .0004 .0012
Pseudo R2 .1190 .1706 .1979 .2367
Log-likelihood –442.8 –416.9 –403.2 –383.7
F test (PW, Accrual) 16.90 22.71 18.21 18.45
Note: SE = standard error.
Table 11A.6 Retirement Probabilities: One-Year Accruals, Women (722 observations)
Demographics, Demographics, 
Earnings, and  Earnings, and 
Cohort Dummies Age Dummies No Controls Demographics
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
A. Not Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension
Pension wealth .0862 .0256 .0827 .0279 .0821 .0276 .0710 .0262
Accrual –.6064 .3176 –.6549 .3398 –.5645 .3296 –.0521 .3181
Spouse wealth .0247 .0158 .0226 .0170 .0314 .0174 .0309 .0166
Net earnings –.0007 .0030 –.0025 .0028
Pseudo R2 .0188 .0702 .0973 .1306
Log-likelihood –313.9 –297.4 –288.8 –278.1
F test (PW, Accrual) 11.29 9.38 9.29 8.23
B. Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension (Penage)
Pension wealth .0730 .0256 .0694 .0278 .0694 .0275 .0678 .0264
Accrual –.3590 .3206 –.4076 .3409 –.3523 .3307 –.0170 .3202
Spouse wealth .0223 .0157 .0199 .0169 .0290 .0172 .0298 .0166
Penage dummy .1312 .0414 .1228 .0411 .1063 .0399 .0543 .0655
Net earnings –.0009 .0030 –.0025 .0028
Pseudo R2 .0378 .0874 .1109 .1319
Log-likelihood –307.8 –291.9 –274.4 –277.7
F test (PW, Accrual) 8.58 6.27 6.36 7.69
Note: SE = standard error.Table 11A.7 Retirement Probabilities: Peak Values, Women (722 observations)
Demographics, Demographics, 
Earnings, and  Earnings, and 
Cohort Dummies Age Dummies No Controls Demographics
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
A. Not Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension
Pension wealth .0735 .0225 .0657 .0251 .0673 .0253 .0712 .0244
Peak value –.2388 .1407 –.3990 .1781 –.3608 .1707 –.1791 .1592
Spouse wealth .0231 .0158 .0185 .0170 .0278 .0173 .0296 .0166
Net earnings –.0011 .0031 –.0027 .0028
Pseudo R2 .0711 .0730 .1004 .1327
Log-likelihood –314.2 –296.5 –287.8 –277.4
F test (PW, Accrual) 10.94 11.04 11.04 9.37
B. Including Age of First Entitlement to Pension (Penage)
Pension wealth .0668 .0224 .0597 .0250 .0607 .0252 .0693 .0245
Peak value –.1634 .1392 –.3151 .1752 –.2930 .1684 –.1627 .1607
Spouse wealth .0216 .0156 .0169 .0168 .0264 .0172 .0289 .0166
Penage dummy .1340 .0409 .1223 .0404 .1055 .0392 .0454 .0646
Net earnings –.0012 .0030 –.0027 .0028
Pseudo R2 .0381 .0907 .1143 .1336
Log-likelihood –307.7 –290.9 –283.3 –277.2
F test (PW, Accrual) 8.89 8.18 8.35 8.62
Note: SE = standard error.Table 11A.8 Retirement Probabilities: Option Values
Men Women
Demographics, Demographics, Demographics, Demographics,
earnings, and earnings, and earnings, and earnings, and
cohort dummies age dummies cohort dummies age dummies
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
Total wealth .0282 .0195 .0650 .0198 .0302 .0282 .0594 .0280
Option value –1.559 .3650 –.6130 .4431 –1.243 .6109 –.3382 .6152
Spouse wealth .0123 .0162 .0243 .0154 .0251 .0172 .0291 .0166
Net earnings .0032 .0014 .0014 .0014 .0032 .0036 –.0014 .0034
Spouse net earnings –.0031 .0016 –.0027 .0015 –.0017 .0016 –.0021 .0015
Pension age .2135 .0464 .0985 .0636 .1126 .0392 .0523 .0650
Diﬀerence in ages –.0010 .0021 –.0033 .0021 –.0067 .0049 –.0065 .0048
Job tenure .0005 .0013 –.0001 .0012 .0028 .0018 .0029 .0018
% of Full-Time 
employment .0213 .0356 .0419 .0338 .0361 .0505 .0307 .0487
Education –.0147 .0191 –.0195 .0187 –.0143 .0330 .0035 .0319
Health score .0158 .0086 .0205 .0083 .0229 .0131 .0265 .0127
Spouse health score –.0078 .0062 –.0086 .0059 –.0210 .0155 –.0236 .0147
Renter –.0021 .0224 –.0155 .0202 –.0154 .0369 –.0035 .0374
Mortgage –.0254 .0216 –.0388 .0197 –.0346 .0320 –.0313 .0307
Industry, engineering .0280 .0354 .0511 .0384 .0119 .0847 –.0107 .0730
Industry, 
manufacturing –.0218 .0306 .0022 .0335 –.0397 .0522 –.0441 .0492
Industry, distribution –.0187 .0286 –.0038 .0306 .0525 .0689 .0535 .0674
Industry, services –.0547 .0240 –.0469 .0241 –.0179 .0527 –.0283 .0515
Industry, government –.0285 .0327 –.0197 .0340
Spouse retired .0769 .0378 .0604 .0352 .1496 .0603 .1325 .0585
Occupational 
pension .0535 .0184 .0490 .0182 .0428 .0428 .0381 .0412
£1–£3,000 wealth .0237 .0270 .0260 .0260 –.0030 .0405 –.0052 .0395
£3,000–£10,000 
wealth .0473 .0351 .0398 .0335 .0295 .0509 .0434 .0523
 £10,000 wealth .0607 .0423 .0255 .0363 –.0097 .0522 –.0321 .0457
Missing wealth .0330 .0552 .0405 .0565 –.0287 .0658 –.0534 .0518
Cohort born 1934 –.0168 .0368
Cohort born 1935 –.0350 .0327
Cohort born 1936 .0094 .0474
Cohort born 1937 –.0364 .0320
Cohort born 1938 –.0406 .0302 .0834 .0590
Cohort born 1939 –.0632 .0265 .0260 .0440
Cohort born 1940 –.0668 .0265 .0440 .0425
Cohort born 1941 –.0729 .0249 .0843 .0355
Cohort born 1942 –.0411 .0367 .1098 .0346
(continued)Table 11A.9 Bootstrap Standard Error (male retirement model)
Linear Age Cohort Dummies Age Dummies
(Marginal Eﬀect) (Marginal Eﬀect) (Marginal Eﬀect)
A. Excluding Age First Eligible
Sample size 1,202–1,375 1,183–1,347 1,158–1,345
Pension wealth
Mean estimate .0749 .0464 .0692
5% .0383 .0089 .0372
95% .1083 .0808 .1014
Option value
Mean estimate –.3861 –1.9043 –.6032
5% –1.2363 –2.6422 –1.3079
95% .4071 –1.2743 .0747
B. Including Age First Eligible
Sample size 1,194–1,345 1,179–1,359 1,106–1,350
Pension wealth
Mean estimate .0510 .0192 .0629
5% .0156 –.0235 .0283
95% .0815 .0555 .1068
Option value
Mean estimate –.3706 –1.7371 –.6833
5% –1.1093 –2.4786 –1.4395
95% .2624 –1.1214 –.0250
Table 11A.8 (continued)
Men Women
Demographics, Demographics, Demographics, Demographics,
earnings, and earnings, and earnings, and earnings, and
cohort dummies age dummies cohort dummies age dummies
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Eﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SEE ﬀect SE
Age = 57 .0268 .1069 –.0239 .0748
Age = 58 –.0040 .0830 .0051 .0782
Age = 59 .0072 .0885 –.0034 .0782
Age = 60 –.0268 .0698 .1531 .1193
Age = 61 –.0008 .0848 .1438 .1067
Age = 62 –.0006 .0856 .0905 .1070
Age = 63 .0615 .1198 .1516 .1308
Age = 64 .0955 .1395 .1266 .1435
Age = 65 .2944 .2241 .4152 .1830
Age = 66 .2087 .2083 .5461 .3560
Age = 67 .3098 .2415
Age = 68 .2218 .2401
Age = 69 .4065 .2744
Age = 70 .7167 .2439
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